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COMMON STOCKS IN TRUST
Life tenants should not be required to starve in
order that remaindermen may ultimately feast.'
In the significant Mayo case,2 the supreme court of Minnesota took
judicial notice of the continued inflationary trend in our economy and con-
cluded that a limitation in the trust instrument to fixed income invest-
ments 3 was inconsistent with the settlor's primary intent "to preserve the
value of the trust corpus." 4 The court's solution was to give the trustee
the right, over his objection, "to invest . . . in corporate stocks of good,
sound investment issues.'" 5 However, in today's investment environment
the inclusion of typical common stocks in trust portfolios is necessarily ac-
companied by a reduction of income.6 Since the life tenants joined in the
remainderman's prayer for relief, the court in Mayo did not have to reach
the question of fairness as between successive beneficiaries; but it would
have been unwarranted for it to have implied a collateral intent that the
dollar amount of income be decreased. At the very least, a construction
requiring maintenance of income seemed justified, and the more logical in-
terpretation would have been that the settlor intended impartial inflation
protection with increases in both corpus and income.
7
I Nirdlinger's Estate (No. 2), 327 Pa. 171, 174, 193 Ati. 30, 32 (1937).
2 In re Trusteeship Under Agreement With Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W2d
900 (1960).
3 Trust instruments forbidding corporate stock investments seem to be the product
of the era immediately following the stock market debacle of 1929. See, e.g., Stanton
v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 150 Cal. App. 2d 763, 310 P.2d 1010 (Dist.
Ct App. 1957). The Mayo opinion gives an excellent summary of changed conditions
since that time. It seems unlikely that a settlor, conditioned by the relative stability
of stock prices in recent years and fully aware of the long-term inflationary trend,
would undertake a broad exclusion of all stocks.
4 In re Trusteeship Under Agreement With Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 94, 105 N.W.2d
900, 902 (1960).
5Id. at 100, 105 N.W.2d at 906. While the Mayo opinion did not distinguish
between classes of corporate stock, it is obvious that inflation protection can be
achieved only with common stock. Absent a conversion privilege, preferred stock
has, for this purpose, the characteristics of bonds and debentures.
6 In May 1964 the yield on the Dow Jones index of 40 bonds was 4.6%, as com-
pared with a yield of 3.39% on the Dow Jones industrials and a yield of 3.17% on
all dividend paying common stocks regularly traded on the NYSE. Barron's, June 1,
1964, p. 57; Cleveland Trust Company Bus. Bull., June 25, 1964, p. 4.
7 Two years later, the same court was asked to permit an upward price-level
adjustment of amounts payable to an income beneficiary on the ground that the Mayo
case had established the principle that a fixed sum of money was actually depleted
by inflation. In re Trusteeship Under Will of Whelan, 263 Minn. 476, 116 N.W.2d
811 (1962). Since the instrument provided for an annuity to be paid to the life
tenants, the court did not grant the request, stating that it was "satisfied that the
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Since inflation protection must be achieved consistently with the tradi-
tional duty to provide the life tenant with an adequate return on the trust
assets,S the trustee's objection in Mayo may have been grounded on a fear
that judicial recognition of inflation 9 might be followed by the imposition
of unattainable standards of fiduciary administration. This Note explores
the problem of reconciling a reasonable yield with growth and the adequacy
of presently available solutions for the life tenant, trustee, and settlor.
Finally, it suggests a remedy that may help to achieve this objective.
I. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. The Consequences of Common Stock Investment
It is axiomatic that the way to maintain purchasing power in an in-
flationary period is to own physical property instead of money. Since this
is most easily accomplished through equity interests in large public cor-
porations, the purchase of common stocks appears to be the most feasible
method for a trustee to combat inflation. If the price of corporate stock
merely represented the sum of the values of the individual corporate assets,
there would be an almost exact correlation between movements in the gen-
eral price level and fluctuations in the value of a trust corpus.
But because the corporation's assets are combined in a business enter-
prise, the investment public appraises such factors as the general economic
climate, the outlook for the particular industry, the company's competitive
position, and the ability of its management, and arrives at a valuation for
the stock which may differ materially from the sum of the assets. Since
1900 the increase in market values represented by the stock averages has
far outpaced the rise in the general price level, but during shorter inter-
mediate periods and with individual stocks, prices have often declined
sharply.10 Thus,'while price level protection through stock ownership is
trustor did not intend the annuitants and remaindermen to maintain a constant relative
interest in the trust." Id. at 482, 116 N.W.2d at 815. (Emphasis added.) That
statement at least implies that the result might have been different had the life
tenant's interest been expressed in terms of income rather than as an annuity.
Courts have seemed less receptive to requests for deviation when initiated by the
income beneficiaries. See In re Trust Under Will of Jones, 221 Minn. 524, 22 N.W.2d
633 (1946) ; Toledo Trust Co. v. Toledo Hosp., 117 Ohio App. 425, 192 N.E.2d 674,
aff'd, 174 Ohio St. 124, 187 N.E.2d 36 (1962). On appeal in the supreme court, the
Toledo case was distinguished from Mayo on the ground "that the dominant intention
of [Dr. Mayo] .. .was to preserve the corpus of the trust" 174 Ohio St. at 127,
187 N.E.2d at 39.
S RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §232, comment b (1959) [hereinafter cited
as RESTATEMENT] ; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS § 232 (2d ed. 1956) [hereinafter cited as ScoTT].
9 Courts have resisted attempts to relate corpus values to the increasing price
level. See, e.g., Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Apponyi, 220 Md. 275, 152
A.2d 184 (1959). Theoretically, as suggested by the appellee in Apponyi, prices can
go either up or down, and the results will balance out. Actually, however, the
consumer price index has declined during only ten of the fifty years from 1913 to
1963 and during that period has more than tripled. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNrrFD STATES 356 (1963) [hereinafter cited as STAT. ABS.].
1OA chart comparing the Dow Jones industrial average with the consumer
price index since 1900 is shown in WIESFNBERGER, INVESTMENT COMPANIES 87 (1964)
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probable, it is by no means assured. Notwithstanding this risk, intelligent
investment in common stocks provides a means by which a trustee can main-
tain the purchasing power of a trust estate and participate in general
economic growth. This opportunity is totally absent when investments
are confined to fixed income securities.
With minor exceptions the rules of trust administration assign the
total benefit of stock price appreciation to corpus 11 and only dividends
to income. To explore the consequences of these rules as applied to today's
typical investments, assume that a trustee may choose to invest a corpus
of $100,000 in either a group of 4Y percent bonds or a portfolio of common
stocks yielding 3 percent. Assume further that the value of the stocks
can reasonably be expected to appreciate 5 percent each year with com-
mensurate increases in dividends.'2 The consequences of the bond pur-
chase are simply defined-the life tenant will receive annual income of
$4,500 and the corpus will remain intact. If the stocks are purchased, the
comparative results are as indicated in Table 1.
Initially the life tenant must accept an income only two-thirds of that
available from bonds, and, despite annual increases, ten years must elapse
before the dividend payments reach $4,500. Only after seventeen years
does the life tenant recapture the cumulative income deficiency, and there-
after, he benefits from the stock purchase to a much smaller degree than
does the remainderman. After twenty years, for example, the life tenant's
cumulative income exceeds what he would have received in bond inter-
est by 10 percent, while the corpus has grown to two and one-half times its
original value.
Clearly, a life tenant with a short life expectancy is irreparably injured
by the stock investment. 13 For an income beneficiary with a longer life
expectancy, the difference between the dividend payments and the alterna-
tive bond interest on the original corpus is gradually reduced, and, after a
considerable number of years, the income beneficiary apparently receives
an actual benefit. Thus, it may be argued that stock investment is also
[hereinafter cited as WiESENBERGER]. Although both indices have risen during the
period as a whole, the stock index has shown considerably more fluctuation, including
a number of relatively steep declines. Furthermore, the fluctuations of a given stock
may vary from the average in both amplitude and direction. For example, in the
ten-year period, 1953-1963, while the average of thirty stocks rose 172%, the gains in
the individual components ranged from 500% for General Foods to a bare 1% for
Swift & Company. See WIESENBERGER 78. See generally Wooley, Areas of Prob-
ability-Their Meaning for Trust Investment, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 188 (1961).
9 1 
REVIsED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 3(b) (8), in NATIONAL CON-
FERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAwS, HANDBOOK 251-60 (1962);
RESTATEMENT § 233, comment c; 3 ScoTT § 233.1.
12 While these figures are arbitrarily selected for mathematical convenience, they
are fairly representative. In May 1964 the yield on all NYSE dividend paying stocks
was 3.17% and the Dow Jones bond yield was 4.6%. See note 6 mspra. During the
thirty-five year period, 1926-1960, the rates of return, compounded annually, on
all NYSE listed common stocks, with reinvestment of dividends, were 9%. See
Fisher & Lorie, Rates of Return on Investments in Common Stocks, J. Bus., Jan.
1964, p. 1.
Is In the example given, the cumulative income deficiency reaches a maximum
of almost $7,500 at the end of nine years.




Year Corpus Income Income From Bonds
1 100,000 3,000 3,000 4,500
2 105,000 3,150 6,150 9,000
3 110,250 3,308 9,458 13,500
4 115,763 3,473 12,931 18,000
5 121,551 3,647 16,578 22,500
6 127,629 3,829 20,407 27,000
7 134,010 4,020 24,427 31,500
8 140,710 4,221 28,648 36,000
9 147,746 4,432 33,080 40,500
10 155,133 4,654 37,734 45,000
11 162,890 4,887 42,621 49,500
12 171,035 5,131 47,752 54,000
13 179,587 5,387 53,139 58,500
14 188,566 5,657 58,796 63,000
15 197,994 5,940 64,736 67,500
16 207,894 6,237 70,973 72,000
17 218,289 6,549 77,522 76,500
18 229,203 6,876 84,398 81,000
19 240,663 7,220 91,618 85,500
20 252,696 7,581 99,199 90,000
in the life tenant's interest because his increasing income justifies the initial
sacrifice he must make.14 This rationale is premised upon the assumption
that the choice between bonds and stocks need be made only once and is
thereafter irrevocable. Under that assumption, a reasonable income for the
life tenant at any time would necessarily be measured by reference to the
initial value of the corpus.
However, when the corpus consists of stock for which there is an active
market, the alternative investment in bonds is continuously available to the
trustee.15 At any time, both theoretically and practically, the trustee could
sell the stocks and invest in bonds producing an income equal to the bond
yield multiplied by the proceeds of the sale. In any year the injury is not
limited to the amount by which $4,500 exceeds the dividend payments, but
is the amount by which the dividends fall short of what could be obtained
if the current value of the corpus were invested in bonds. Thus, in the
14 Trustees may attempt to justify the inclusion even of IBM Corporation stock,
currently yielding less than l%, on the ground that the current dividend represents
a reasonable or even an excessive yield on the trust's original cost of the stock.
This argument ignores the fact that sale of the stock and reinvestment of the proceeds
in safe bonds would more than quadruple current income.
15 This analysis and the material which follows is necessarily based on the assump-
tion of immediate marketability at an established price.
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example given, the life tenant's injury does not decrease in time and
eventually disappear, but actually increases each year while the corpus
appreciates.
B. The Effect of Earnings Retention
Since the value of income producing property reflects its ability to
produce income, the trust rule which assigns the total benefit of apprecia-
tion to the corpus does not normally prejudice the life tenant. It is
based on the justifiable premise that a rise in the value of the property is
accompanied by a commensurate increase in income. In the case of com-
mon stock, however, the traditional relationship is not preserved. The
interposition of the corporate form between the income producing property
and the trustee enables corporate directors to convert all or part of
corporate earnings into additional corporate capital by failing fully to
distribute the earnings. 16 The extent to which an increment in the price
of a stock reflects these retained earnings is not appreciation in the tradi-
tional sense that the corporate assets have become more valuable; rather
it represents a quantitative addition to those assets which the life tenant
himself has been compelled to provide. Moreover, the individual stock-
holder who is denied immediate possession of his full share of corporate
earnings receives the full benefit of the appreciation in the value of his stock
attributable to the newly created capital. The life tenant, on the other
hand, can benefit only to the extent that additional earnings produced by
this capital are distributed within the duration of his interest.' 7 An in-
dividual who is satisfied with the investment potential of a low yielding
stock may sell off a part of his appreciated holdings to supplement an in-
adequate dividend. This procedure is of no help to a life tenant receiving
a subnormal yield, since the proceeds of the sale by a trustee must be
retained in the corpus.' 8
The so-called Pennsylvania rules in force in some jurisdictions have
provided an uneven remedy which compensates the life tenant upon the
happening of an event which would preclude the distribution of earn-
ings accumulated during the period of his beneficial ownership.19 These
16 See 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5349 (perm. ed. 1932).
17 Trust law has generally followed corporation law by limiting the life tenant
to such distributions which, as a stockholder, he could have compelled. See 3 SCOTT
§§236.1-.2. Compare REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §4(e). For
all practical purposes, a stockholder may compel payment of a dividend only after a
declaration by the directors. See 11 FLETCHER, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 5322, 5325.
1 8 
REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AT § 3 (b) (1) ; RESTATEMENT § 233,
comment b.
19 These rules have been primarily applied to cases in which retained earnings
have been capitalized by the declaration of a stock dividend. In Pennsylvania, they
have been extended to include cases of corporate reorganization, lit re Fisher's Estate,
344 Pa. 607, 26 A.2d 192 (1942); Daily's Estate, 323 Pa. 42, 186 Atl. 754 (1936),
and sale by the trustee, Nirdlinger's Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 Atl. 200 (1927). See
3 SCOTT § 236.3, at 1817-18. Mechanical application of the rules has frequently pro-
duced results highly prejudicial to the remainderman. See note 85 infra and accom-
panying text.
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rules, however, are based on the assumption that the mere possibility of a
lawful dividend distribution protects the life tenant against permanent
loss from the retention of earnings. This is obviously unwarranted when
the usual restraint on dividend payments is not the state law but a com-
bination of economic necessity and an almost universal desire for corporate
expansion.20 Moreover, the law has never extended this theory to recog-
nize a life tenant's interest in retained earnings in the absence of either
corporate action or the trustee's sale of the stock.
2 1
C. A Special Situation-The Trustee-Controlled Corporation
Despite the failure to recognize a life tenant's interest in the increment
in the price of a stock attributable to retained earnings, the law has enabled
life tenants to compel a reasonable distribution of earnings when the cor-
poration is trustee-controlled. In these situations courts have often re-
quired that the trustee-directors maintain a corporate dividend policy which
reflects the separate beneficial interests in the enterprise. 22 However, it is
apparent from the cases that earnings as defined by trust principles are not
synonomous with earnings as determined by the federal income tax or state
corporation law.
For example, a well established trust principle is that "recurring or
ordinary expenses . . . necessary to preserve the trust property or its
value are payable out of income." 2 If trust principles are to determine the
financial policy of a corporate enterprise, this rule should embrace such
expenditures as the replacement of fixed assets at costs exceeding the
amounts deducted from income for depreciation,24 the additional commit-
20 In 1960 surplus and undivided profit of all American corporations was $268
billion, or 193% of total capital stock. The similar ratio in 1940 was only 55%.
STAT. ABs. 494. During the five year period, 1957-1961, all American corporations
earned $111.9 billion, paid out $68.1 billion in dividends, and retained $43.8 billion.
Id. at 495. A comparison of the Dow Jones industrial yield of 3.39% with the price-
earnings ratio of 20.0 indicates that the thirty corporations included in that index
are currently retaining 32% of their earnings. An examination of the individual
stocks of the Dow Jones industrial average indicates that only three of the thirty
companies included therein provide a yield exceeding the 4.6% currently available
from bonds. Barron's, June 1, 1964, pp. 37-44, 57.
21 See 3 ScoTT § 236.3, at 1818.
22 See 3 ScoTT § 236.11 ; Krasnowiecki, Existing Rules of Trust Administration:
A Stranglehold on the Trustee-Controlled Business Enterprise (pts. 1-2), 110 U. PA.
L. Rav. 506, 816 (1962). In his incisive two-part article Professor Krasnowiecki
notes that the strict application of trust principles to the unincorporated business
unreasonably impedes the ability of the trustee to continue the enterprise. He con-
cludes that the corporate form is almost a prerequisite to the successful management
of a trustee-controlled business. Unfortunately, the unpenetrability of the corporate
shield may overcompensate for the trust law's bias in favor of life tenants,
2 3 ScoTT § 233.2, at 1752.
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(g), 1011, 1012 require that depreciation deduc-
tions be based on original cost. See American Institute of Accountants, Accounting
Research Bull. No. 43 (1953), which rejects a proposed change in the current method
of depreciation accounting, but recognizes the problem created by an increasing price
level and advocates "supplementary financial schedules . . . by which management
may explain the need for retention of earnings."
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ment of funds needed to carry an inflated dollar amount of receivables 2 5
and inventories, 26 and the scheduled repayments required to retire previ-
ously contracted debt.27 Although these expenditures do not reduce cur-
rent earnings in the context of the corporate tax return or balance sheet,
they do not constitute reinvested earnings in the trust sense, since the
directors have no real discretion to refuse to make them. Failure to make
these investments would effect an actual shrinkage of the enterprise-a
result plainly inconsistent with the theory that the trust property be
preserved.28 In contrast purely discretionary expenditures, such as those
required to enter a new line of business or a previously unexploited geo-
graphical area, while serving proper corporate purposes, would seem to
constitute an improper use of the life tenant's funds for the primary benefit
of the remainderman.
The formulation of a trust-oriented dividend policy, therefore, requires
a delicate balance between the necessity of maintaining the corporation's
vitality and the life tenant's right to receive the current economic benefit
from the enterprise. 29 When the corporation is trustee-managed, the courts
have had no choice but to attempt to accommodate the competing interests.
However, when the trustee has but a small minority stock interest, a rule
which requires him to analyze and allocate corporate earnings would be
unduly burdensome. 0
2- In 1950 total corporate receivables stood at $108 billion. The 20% increase
in the price level in the ten years following would seem to have required that some
$22 billion of profits be committed to carry receivables representing the same physical
volume of business. STAT. Ans. 356, 494.
26 Under standard accounting practice, an increase in the value of the same physical
quantity of inventory would reduce the cost of goods sold and increase the net profit.
See RESTATEMENT § 233, comment c. From 1950 to 1960, the price level increased
by 20%o. Since corporate inventories in 1950 stood at $55 billion, it would seem that
$11 billion of corporate profits reported during that period can be attributed to
inventory appreciation. STAT. ABS. 356, 494.
27 The procedure of charging repayments against income was held proper in
Freeman v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., 232 Ark. 654, 339 S.W.2d 427 (1960), even
though the corporation had been dissolved. The court reasoned that the settlor
"expected the corporation to continue in being and intended for the [repayments]
• . . to be paid out of . . . profits before the declaration of dividends." Id. at
657, 339 S.W.2d at 429. But see Matter of Adler, 164 Misc. 544, 299 N.Y. Supp. 542
(Surr. Ct. 1937), in which it was held that debt could not be retired out of earnings,
despite the corporate form.
28 See Freeman v. Farmers Bank & Trust Co., supra note 27; Krasnowiecki,
supra note 22.
29An alternative to the payment of cash dividends would be to evidence dis-
cretionary earnings reinvestment by stock dividends. The efficacy of this method,
however, would require the allocation of the dividend to the life tenant, a result
precluded by the law of many jurisdictions, and would depend on the marketability
of the dividend stock. Since in the case of a closely held corporation, the sale of a
small minority interest would be difficult, if not impossible, this method would seem
to offer little more current protection than would be achieved without it.
Furthermore, even if the dividend stock could be sold, it might be undesirable,
from the standpoint of the remainderman, to have it fall into outside hands. Since
the remainderman will ultimately be the controlling stockholder, he is obviously the
most logical buyer for additional stock. Problems of allocation and unfairness could
therefore be avoided by a direct sale of stock by the corporation to the remainderman.
30 The accounting problems presented by the Pennsylvania rules, which, in effect,
assign all retained earnings to the life tenant, have been severe. See Cohan & Dean,
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D. An Alternative Theory-True Cost
To serve their proper function, the rules of trust administration should
be a means of arriving at the presumed intent of the settlor3 1 In a trust
which cannot fairly be construed to indicate a preference for the remainder-
man, the current rule-only dividends to income and all appreciation to
corpus 31--applied to today's typical common stock seems incapable of
implementing an impartial settlor's will. If fairness between successive
beneficiaries cannot be achieved without some recognition of the life tenant's
interest in retained earnings, a manageable approach should be sought to
assign him a share of the benefits these earnings produce.
A prudent investor purchases a bond with the expectation that he will
receive a reasonable current income from the interest payments and a sum
approximately equal to his original outlay of funds at maturity. Because
of the greater risk, he will normally demand a higher return from a stock
investment. But when a currently profitable corporation reinvests a large
percentage of its earnings, it is no less reasonable to expect that the market
value of its stock will increase than to assume that it will meet its obliga-
tions as they mature. Thus, the prudent buyer of stocks need not require
that his return be provided wholly by dividend payments, so long as he
can justify the acceptance of a lower yield by a well founded expectation
of growth.
33
For the individual investor, ignoring tax consequences, the form of
the return is immaterial. But for the trustee, who is charged with the duty
"not to sacrifice income for the purpose of increasing the value of the
Legal, Tax and Accounting Aspects of Fiduciary Apportionment of Stock Proceeds:
The Non-Statutory Pennsylvania Rules, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1957). The prob-
lems of an approach based on the separation of mandatory from discretionary earnings
retention would be overwhelming.
31 See Note, Allocation Between Life Beneficiary and Rentainderman, 1942 Wis.
L. REv. 299.
323 ScoTT § 236.3, at 1818; see Scott, Principal or Income? How Dividends
Are Treated Under Proposed Revision of Uniform Act, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 180
(1961).
33 X most striking illustration is a comparison'of the yield from common stocks
with the yield from senior securities of the same companies.
Yield in Percent
Company Common Preferred Bond
Alcoa 1.6 - 4.3
American Can 4.6 4.4 -
American Telephone 2.9 - 4.4
Bethlehem Steel 4.0 4.6 4.5
DuPont 2.3 4.3 -
Gen'l Electric 2.7 - 4.3
Gen'l Foods 2.4 - 4.3
Inl Harvester 3.7 4.4 4.5
Int'l Paper 3.8 4.0 -
Owens Illinois 2.5 4.0 -
Proctor & Gamble 2.2 - 4.3
Sears, Roebuck 1.4 - 4.5
Standard Oil (NJ.) 32 - 4.4
Texaco 2.8 - 4.3
U. S. Steel 3.5 4.7 4.4
Westinghouse 3.8 4.4 4.5
Barron's, June 1, 1964, pp. 37-44, 55-56.
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principal," 34 the form is crucial. The true cost of a stock with a subnormal
yield is both the initial outlay of funds and the continued sacrifice of income
which its retention requires. To the extent that dividend income falls
short of the interest that could be obtained from an alternative bond in-
vestment, appreciation is not profit but an element of cost. If stocks are
prudently selected,35 the allocation of the income deficiency to the life tenant
would not prejudice the remainderman, since at least this much appreciation
must have been reasonably anticipated in order to justify the investment
ab initio. In fact many of the current solutions to the problem of reconciling
growth with reasonable income involve the distribution of corpus-either
under provisions in the instrument or pursuant to allocation rules which,
absent the inclusion of low yielding stocks which are likely to appreciate,
might seriously prejudice the remainder interest.
II. CURRENT SOLUTIONS
A. The Remedies of the Life Tenant
The possibility that a trustee might breach his duty of impartiality by
investing in low-yielding stock has always existed. 36 Until 1957, however,
the average yield on all dividend-paying stocks regularly traded on the New
York Stock Exchange had gone below 4 percent for only two brief periods.
Since that time, however, the average yield has never exceeded 4 percent
and, for most of the period since 1961, has been less than 3Y2 percent.
37
Moreover, the long-term trend appears to be toward lower yields, and the
tax-conscious investing public has shown an understandable preference for
stocks of well established companies paying low dividends and reinvesting
a large percentage of their earnings. 38 However, the legal remedies avail-
3 4 RESTATEMENT § 232, comment b; 3 ScoTT § 232, at 1745.
35 The ground on which common stocks have been excluded from trust investments
is not that they are likely to appreciate, but that they may decline. Professor Scott
points out that the possibility of appreciation can, in the case of a general inflation,
make shares of stock a safer investment than bonds and certainly one that is more
prudent. 3 Scor § 227.11, at 1691.











Cleveland Trust Company Bus. Bull., June 25, 1964, p. 4.
38 The most obvious reason for this preference is the favorable capital gains treat-
ment given to profit from the sale of stock. Another reason, unrelated to tax con-
siderations, is the fact that many corporations are able to reinvest earnings to produce
returns far exceeding that available to the individual investor.
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able to a life tenant are inadequate to avoid prejudice in today's investment
environment.
1. Exclusion
When a trustee holds securities which are not proper trust invest-
ments, he has a duty to dispose of them 3 9 which may be enforced in the
courts. From the standpoint of the life tenant, whose interest is limited
only to dividends, today's typical common stocks are improper because they
are underproductive. 4o  Other forms of property generally categorized as
underproductive, such as defaulted bonds and mortgages or real estate
which cannot be rented, are also imprudent investments, because whatever
appeal they may have is grounded on pure speculation. Stock in a cur-
rently profitable and growing corporation, despite a low yield, can be dis-
tinguished because of the reasonable expectation of appreciation based
upon increased asset value.41  Since the "prudent-man" standard dis-
tinguishes only between investment and speculation, irrespective of
current yield, it does not serve, as it often does in the context of other
underproductive property, as a ground for the exclusion of low yielding
investment grade stocks.42 For example, it is almost inconceivable that a
court would compel a trustee to dispose of American Telephone & Tele-
graph Company stock, presently yielding 2.8 percent, on the ground that
it was an "imprudent" investment.
However, with typical investment grade stocks yielding less than 3
percent, a life tenant would seem justified in requesting their exclusion on
the ground that they are prejudicially underproductive. It seems inevitable
that life tenants will soon present this claim before the courts,43 but the
standards which will determine excludability are unclear. Certainly the 1
percent standard by which the Uniform Principal and Income Act 4 defines
underproductive property is much too low to offer any meaningful protec-
tion. Even a limit of 3% percent, the average yield of all NYSE listed
dividend paying stocks, would condone the retention of stock yielding 30
percent less than bonds. More importantly, the selection of any fixed per-
centage standard less than the bond yield has the dual disadvantage of
arbitrarily excluding all lower yielding stocks, irrespective of investment
39 See 3 SCOTT § 230.
40 See RESTATEMENT § 240, comment b; 3 SCOTT § 240, at 1876.
41 An increase in stock prices resulting from a rise in the general price level or
from more favorable investor sentiment is predictable only in a speculative sense.
But an increase due to earnings reinvestment represents a planned and measurable
addition to the corporate assets. See text following note 16 zpra.
42 See 3 ScoTT § 227.11, at 1691; note 35 supra.
43 This question was present in Matter of Sheridan, 32 Misc. 2d 38, 222 N.Y.S.2d
751 (Surr. Ct. 1961), where it was held that the life tenant, who was also a co-trustee,
was estopped from securing an apportionment of the proceeds of sale of low-yielding
stock, since he had never objected to the trust's holdings. The court did not have to
decide whether the life tenant, bad he objected, could have compelled sale.
44 "[A]ny part of principal which has not produced an average net income of at
least 1% per year of its inventory value for more than a year . . . ." REVIsED
UNIFORM PRNCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 12(a). (Emphasis added.)
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merit, while permitting the inclusion of stock only slightly less prejudicial
to the life tenant. If the Mayo court properly appraised the adverse effects
of a settlor-imposed exclusion of common stocks, a similar tendency in the
law of trust administration seems equally undesirable.
The alternatives to the imposition of an inflexible standard are also
unsatisfactory. Failure to select an arbitrary percentage would involve the
courts in a case by case adjudication of the investment merits of individual
trust portfolios in the light of the beneficiaries' needs-a task for which
they are obviously ill equipped. To leave the matter within the broad dis-
cretion of the trustee, reserving legal redress only for the infrequent occa-
sions when the abuse of that discretion is most flagrant, would be to leave
the life tenant virtually remediless. Moreover, it would permit the trustee
materially to alter the beneficial interests, a result contrary to the policy
behind existing trust law.45 A trustee, nominally without power to ac-
cumulate income for the benefit of the remainderman, could, in effect,
achieve precisely that result through the action of corporate boards of
directors.
46
2. Apportionment Upon Sale
The only other remedy seemingly available to the life tenant is the
allocation of a portion of the proceeds of sale of low-yielding stock to com-
pensate him for the loss of income while the property had been under-
productive. 47  This theory was recently considered by a New York court
in Matter of Sheridan,48 in which the representatives of a deceased life
tenant petitioned for a share of the proceeds of the sale of certain'stocks
4American courts have not gone as far as the English court which held that a
broad power of allocation was repugnant to the nature of the beneficial interests given
by the settlor and contrary to public policy as an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of
the court. In re Wynn, [1952] 1 Ch. 271. But there is a marked judicial reluctance
to implement such powers fully. See Doty v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 503 (1st Cir.
1945); American Security & Trust Co. v. Frost, 117 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 312 U.S. 707 (1941) ; Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co. v. Morse,
356 Mo. 336, 201 S.W.2d 915 (1947); Note, Discretionary Income and Principal
Clauses in Trust Instruments, 50 YALE L.J. 1467 (1941).
46 See RESTATEMENT § 236, comment y; 3 ScoTT § 236.11. "The mere fact that
the corporation has received income does not mean that the shareholders have received
income; the earnings of the corporation are not income of the shareholders." Id.
at 1837.
47 In the case of underproductive property: "The sum allocated as delayed income
is the difference between the net proceeds and the amount which, had it been invested
at simple interest at [4%] per year while the property was underproductive, would
have produced the net proceeds. This sum . . . is income, and the balance is principal."
REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 12(b).
This is to be distinguished from the apportionment required by Nirdlinger's
Estate, 290 Pa. 457, 139 AtI. 200 (1927), which held that the life tenant was entitled
to that portion of the proceeds of sale which represented "accumulated earnings
sufficiently ear marked that they can be ascertained," irrespective of whether the
stock had been underproductive. This theory was not adopted in other jurisdictions
and has since been rejected, even in Pennsylvania, by the legislature. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 3470.5(3) (1964).
48 32 Misc. 2d 38, 222 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Surr. Ct 1961). Although the case was
decided on the ground of estoppel, see note 43 supra, its analysis of the requisites of
apportionment would have been the same absent that ground.
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which the trust had held for many years during which the dividends had
been relatively low and substantial appreciation had taken place. The court
denied the request, stating that:
The right of [an income] . . . beneficiary to an allocated por-
tion of the proceeds of sale of underproductive property arises
only in cases where the trustee had been under a duty to sell the
underproductive property and had been unable promptly to do so.
It is the delayed execution of the duty which gives rise to the right
to allocation of the proceeds.
49
In this court's view the availability of apportionment requires two
precedent conditions. The first is a clear duty to sell which cannot, in the
light of present authorities, be established except in the most flagrant cases
of abuse.50 In the case of listed stocks, the existence of the second condi-
tion-a justifiable delay 51 -is impossible. As the court said:
The securities were readily salable in the open market, and the
trustees could at any time have joined in a sale . . . . This was
not a case where the market did not fairly reflect the value of the
stock and the trustees felt impelled to await a more fair oppor-
tunity for sale. The securities could have been sold at almost any
time . . . for their reasonable value.
52
Apportionment, therefore, is not an independent remedy, but merely a form
of ancillary relief, wholly dependent on the availability of the remedy of
exclusion.
Although the position of the court presently precludes the use of this
remedy to alleviate the loss of income to the life tenant, it is sound and
necessary for the protection of trustees. In many cases the allowance of
apportionment would not impose any personal liability upon the trustee
since the funds would still be under his control. But the possibility exists
that part or all of the corpus would have been properly distributed before
an action to apportion was instituted. Unless well-defined standards on the
underproductivity of common stocks are established, the threat of such an
action would impede corpus distributions in accordance with the terms of
the trust. However, should clear standards eventually emerge, the imposi-
tion of personal liability would not be improper, because the trustee would
then be on notice to dispose of the underproductive stock without delay.
49 Id. at 39-40, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 753.5OCompare Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker, 52 R.I. 227, 160 At. 465
(1932), in which an unprecedented decision to allocate stock dividends to corpus was
held to justify apportionment of the proceeds when the stock was sold as an inappro-
priate trust investment.
51The principle of justifiable delay has its most common application when the
property consists of unproductive land or defaulted obligations and forced sale is
likely to result in "distress" prices. It would be equally applicable to stock in closely-
held corporations with no established market. See 3 Sco-r § 240, at 1877. When the
trustee cannot justify a delay, it would seem that the life tenant's remedy would not
be against the trust for apportionment, but against the trustee for surcharge.52 Matter of Sheridan, 32 Misc. 2d 38, 39, 222 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
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B. The Position of the Trustee
In formulating his investment program it is desirable that a trustee
accommodate the financial needs of the income beneficiaries, provided this
can be done without endangering the remainderman's interest.53 Thus,
when a trust is the life tenant's sole source of income, safety and continuity
of receipts should be his primary consideration. When the life tenant is a
high-bracket taxpayer, municipal bonds might be preferred either to higher
yielding government or corporate obligations or to investments affording
the opportunity for appreciation.54 However, when a trustee foregoes cur-
rent income in order to own growing equities to preserve the purchasing
power of the remainder, one beneficial interest has been prejudiced to
accommodate a subsequent interest.
The trustee's discretion to balance reasonable income against safety
of principal has always given him some power to affect the value of the
beneficial interests within relatively narrow limits.55 However, a trustee
with the power to invest in common stocks is presently in a position to
vary the value of the successive interests to a substantial degree. By
investing in a representative group of stocks, such as the Dow Jones
industrials, instead of bonds, he can reduce the income interest by almost
a third.&5 6 By concentrating on low-yield investment grade issues, he can
reduce it by a half or more.
57
For the trustee who is sensitive to the duty of maintaining reasonable
income for the life tenant and the desirability of preserving the purchasing
power of the corpus, the problem has been to formulate an investment
program which satisfies both objectives within the framework of existing
rules of allocation.
1. Diversification
The most frequently offered solution to this problem is the "balanced
fund" approach in which the trustee combines fixed-income investments
in some proportion with common stocks to achieve a higher current
return.58  Although this is probably the most feasible method that can be
53 See RESTATEMENT § 227, comment o; 3 ScoTT § 227.12, at 1694.
54 See Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, 27 N.J. 332, 142 A.2d 865 (1958).
55 From the table in note 33 supra, it will be noted that the bond yields are all
between 4.3% and 4.5%, and the preferred stock yields are all in the comparatively
narrow range between 4.0% and 4.77. In contrast the common stock yields vary
between 1.4%o and 4.6%.
-6 See note 6 supra.
57 Of the thirty stocks in the Dow Jones industrial average, eleven yield between
2% and 3% and three, Alcoa, Eastman Kodak, and Sears Roebuck, less than 2%.
Barron's, June 1, 1964, pp. 37-44.
5S See Duncan, Trustee Dileminw-What To Do About Growth Stocks., 100
TRuSTS & ESTATES 533 (1961), in which the author concludes that the trustee "must
nevertheless acquire in his portfolio stocks which have the reasonable expectation of
increasing in value while they continue to provide a living for the income beneficiaries.'
Id. at 536. (Emphasis added.)
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employed in the context of modern trust administration rules, it merely
mitigates the injury by averaging a normal yield with a subnormal yield;
if the imbalance is to be completely redressed, it would be necessary to
include assets which produce an above average return. However, stocks
or bonds paying an above average return may be considered over-
speculative and improper trust investments. 59 Wasting property, such as
an annuity, would be entirely safe, but the higher return is accompanied
by a certain, or at least probable, reduction in value. 60 Unless the trustee
is able to vary the established allocation rules, he would be under a duty
to apportion the receipts from such property,61 thus limiting the life
tenant's income therefrom to the normal trust yield. 62
Real estate may be an effective type of overproductive property for
balancing the total trust income.60 A higher yield to the life tenant from
real estate may result not only from increased risk but from the trust
law which, in many jurisdictions, does not require or may even forbid
the trustee's deducting depreciation from the rentals.6 4  Even where
depreciation is set aside and added to corpus, 5 the tax law may provide
the life tenant with a large part of the tax benefit and improve his net
return.66 However, real estate is generally not a practical trust investment
because of its lack of liquidity and the large unit investment required.
59 Of the thirty stocks in the Dow Jones industrial average, only six yield between
4% and 5% and none higher. "Barron's, June 1, 1964, pp. 37-44. In 1963 Moody's
Corporate Baa Bond Yield was only 4.86%. WIESENBERGER 84.
60 Considered independently, the purchase of an annuity would be proper only
when the trustee has the power to invade corpus for the benefit of the life tenant.
See 3 ScoTT § 227.8. But when such overproductive property has the effect only of
compensating for underproductive assets which are properly included in the trust
estate, the ground for exclusion loses much of its force.
61RESTATEMENT § 239(a) ; 3 ScoTT § 239.
02 REVIsED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 11 limits the amount allocable
to income to 5% of the inventory value of the principal.
A fee interest in real estate has the additional advantage of providing protection
against an increasing price level. Unless encumbered by long term leases, both the
rental income and principal value should increase to benefit both life tenant and
remainderman. This is not surprising, since the law of trusts was formulated in an
era when undeveloped agricultural land represented the bulk of private capital. In
a sense the rules of trust administration are designed to obtain from other forms
of capital the equitable distribution of benefits that naturally flow from the ownership
of land.
643 SCOTT § 239.4. In this respect real estate is a wasting asset to which the
normal apportionment rules do not apply.
65 REvism UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT § 13(a) (2); RESTATEMENT
§ 239, comment h.
6 6 When the trustee takes an accelerated depreciation as provided by INT. Rxv.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 167(b) (2)-(4), the deduction will probably exceed the amount which
the trust law requires to be set aside and added to corpus. In that event the excess
would be allocated, wholly or in part, to the life tenant. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(g)-1 (b)
(1956). Since depreciation reduces the basis of the property, this procedure not only
reduces the life tenant's current tax, but results in additional tax to the trust when
the property is sold. Furthermore, a new section may require the trust, upon sale,
to treat recaptured excess depreciation as ordinary income. See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 1250.
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Moreover, successful real estate operations require an expertise not gen-
erally available from most individual and many corporate trustees.
67
2. Mutual Funds
The purchase of shares in a regulated investment company or mutual
fund provides a different approach to the problem. When mutual fund
assets are invested largely in equities, their income distributions, repre-
senting interest and dividends, are relatively low.68 However, the funds
realize some of the appreciation in the stocks they hold and periodically
pass it along to their shareholders as capital gain distributions. Thus
the total return on mutual fund shares is usually comparable to the yield
on fixed income investments 69 and is high enough to attract investors
requiring an ample current income. When the fund assets are large and
varied, it is possible, by selective realization of gains and losses, to maintain
a steady distribution rate, even during a temporary market decline.
However, a trustee can achieve a reasonable return for the life
tenant only if the capital gain distributions are allocated to the life tenant.7 0
Relatively few jurisdictions have considered this problem. Significantly,
almost every court, when confronted by the life tenant seeking a reasonable
return from the previously invested trust assets, has held capital gain
distributions to be income.7 1 Although the bases of decision have varied,
the underlying rationale seems to be that fairness to the life tenant requires
a return in excess of that provided by income distributions alone.72  On
the other hand, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,7 four
67The real estate investment trust may be a vehicle to provide this expertise as
well as to eliminate the disadvantages of lack of liquidity and large unit investment.
It is probable, however, that the return from such investments, after the costs of
professional management and risk distribution have been deducted, would be sub-
stantially lower than the income from the direct ownership of real estate.
68 See WIESENBmEGER 58.
09 See charts of statistical history of individual funds in WESENBERGER 186-295.
70 In the six year period, 1958-1963, the average yield from income dividends from
balanced funds was 2.9%. Yields from funds stressing growth stocks were consider-
ably less. Only the yields from income funds, whose holdings consist primarily of bonds
and preferred stocks, approached a level comparable to the bond yield. WIESEN-
3ERGER 58.
7
1 Rosenburg v. Lombardi, 222 Md. 346, 160 A.2d 601 (1960) ; In re Trust of
Gardner, 123 N.W.2d 69 (Minn. 1963) ; Coates v. Coates, 304 S.W.2d 874 (Mo. 1957) ;
Briel v. Mody, 77 N.J. Super. 306, 186 A.2d 314 (Ch. 1962) ; Lovett Estate (No. 2),
78 Pa. D. & C. 21 (Orphans' Ct. Luzerne County 1951). Only in Maryland, where
the court held capital gain distributions to be profits from the sale of assets in the
ordinary course of business, and in Minnesota, where the court construed the state's
Principal & Income Act, can it be said that the law is settled. The issue has not
reached the courts of last resort in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, and the decision
of the Missouri court in Coates could be limited to its particular facts.
72 The life tenant is further prejudiced by the fact that management fees, intended
to compensate for producing both income and growth, are charged entirely against
income. See WIESENBERGER 40.
73 RVmsam UxrFop.u PRMCIPCAL AND INComE Acr § 6(c).
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legislatures,74 and the Massachusetts court 75 have reached the opposite
result. This view disregards the fund's corporate form and treats its
assets as belonging directly to the trustee. Under this concept, gain
realized from the sale of capital assets is properly allocated to corpus.
Although this approach is theoretically sound, it ignores the practical fact
that the mutual fund, by converting capital into income, is compensating
its shareholders for the underlying corporations' conversion of income into
capital through retained earnings.
Unless the settlor has provided for the allocation of capital gain
distributions to income or has given the trustee discretion to do so,7 6
mutual funds would seem to be an impartial trust investment only where
the law is settled in favor of the life tenant. In states where the question
has not been settled, a trustee must anticipate a future decision or statute
favorable to the remainderman. At best, the required allocation to corpus
would be prospective in effect, thus making mutual funds inappropriate
investments thereafter. If it is retroactive, the trustee might have to make
deductions from income to compensate for the improperly allocated dis-
tributions.7 7 At worst, he might be subjected to surcharge.7 8
3. Selective Investment
A trustee may confine his common stock investments to those issues
which, under the applicable rules of trust administration, provide the life
tenant with an income reasonably comparable to the bond yield. Chief
among these are companies which distribute a large proportion of current
earnings in cash. Many such companies are sound investments, but the
failure to reinvest earnings may suggest that the industry offers little
opportunity for growth, or that the particular management is unresponsive
to existing opportunities. Moreover, from the standpoint of sound invest-
ment policy, it would be unwise to exclude companies with ample current
74 FLA. STAT. ANN. §690.06(l) (Supp. 1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 160,
§18 (Supp. 1963); N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAW §17-a(7); Wis. STAT. ANN. §231.40
(5) (a) (Supp. 1964).
75 Tait v. Peck, 194 N.E.2d 707 (Mass. 1963). The principal authority on which
the court rests is REvism UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOmE AcT §6(c). See also
Rev. Rul. 60-385, 1960-2 CuM. Buu.. 77; 112 U. PA. L. Rzv. 932 (1964).
76 Even a grant of discretion to the trustee may be ineffective in Florida, where
the statute provides "that all distributions of capital of mutual investment trusts shall
be deemed principal irrespective of the choice made by the trustee." FLA. STAT. ANN.
§690.06(1) (Supp. 1963). (Emphasis added.)
77 RESTATEMENT § 254, comment a; 3 ScoTT § 254.
7 8 RESTATEMENT § 226, comment b; 2 ScoTr § 226, at 1648. In this event the
trustee would ordinarily acquire a right to indemnity by the life tenant, but, under
some circumstances, it might be unenforceable. See RESTATEMENT § 254, comments
d, e; 3 ScoTT §§ 254.1-.2. Although a finding of negligence is neither essential to
establish trustee's liability nor a defense by a life tenant in an action for indemni-
fication, the degree of fault attributed to the trustee will undoubtedly play some part
in a court's judgment. With the law in its present unsettled state, it does not seem
probable that a trustee would be found negligent. But if the Revised Uniform Act's
approach is more widely adopted, a trustee would be ill-advised to undertake the risk.
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earnings and a policy of far-sighted reinvestment which would enable the
stockholders to participate in general economic growth.7 9
In jurisdictions which do not strictly adhere to the Massachusetts
rule, which allocates all stock dividends to corpus,8 0 the trustee may prop-
erly invest in companies which regularly declare small stock dividends to
evidence reinvested earnings. However, the number of corporations
adopting this policy, while probably increasing, is still relatively small.81
If the trustee limits his purchases only to these issues, he excludes
companies which may have equal or better present and prospective earn-
ings, but whose directors may prefer to have the company's growth
reflected either by a higher price per share or additional shares created
by a stock split instead of a dividend.
Finally, a trustee may invest in common stocks without regard to
current dividend policy with the expectation 82 that some of the companies
might make an occasional but substantial distribution which would be
allocated to the life tenant.8 3 But even in the unlikely event that such
distributions would eventually effectuate fairness between beneficiaries,
this policy would have the undesirable result of producing a widely
fluctuating income.
Reliance on the allocation of extraordinary corporate distributions to
income seems unwise ," for still another reason. The application of the
Pennsylvania rule has frequently resulted in windfalls to the life tenant
entirely disproportionate to the extent to which his interest has been
prejudiced.s 5 In reaction to these results, there seems to be a trend
79 Among the factors which trustees consider desirable in selecting common stock
investments are growth rates exceeding that of the economy in general, repeated new
highs in sales and earnings, relatively low labor costs, and research-minded manage-
ment, particularly with regard to new products. It should be noted that all of these
factors are indicative of companies reinvesting substantial portions of their earnings .
80 See 3 SCOTT § 236.3. This rule has been adopted by REvisED UNIFORM PRINCI-
PAL AND INCOME ACT § 6(a).
81 For a corporation wishing to invest a large proportion of its earnings, a policy
of regular stock dividends may improve the marketability of its stock without necessi-
tating the disbursement of needed cash. When a family holds a substantial interest
in a corporation and can influence dividend policy, a stock dividend enables the
members to realize spendable income at capital gains tax rates. However, when part
of the family interest is held in trust for successive beneficiaries, a shift from the
Pennsylvania to the Massachusetts rule may prove disastrous to the income benefici-
aries of such trusts. Cf. Pew Trust, 411 Pa. 96, 191 A.2d 399 (1963), 112 U. PA.
L. Rv. 290.
82 The purchase of a specific stock for the purpose of securing an abnormal
income distribution might to held to violate the duty of impartiality. See Dunham,
A Trustee's Dilemma as to Principal and Income, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 405 (1959).
83 Since the Pennsylvania rule does not distinguish stock dividends by size, even
a 50% or 100% dividend would be allocated to income, provided that the book value
of the remaining corpus shares was not impaired. REVISED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL
AND INCOME ACT § 6(d) provides that dividends paid in stock of another corporation,
as would be the case in a spin-off, are allocable to income.
84 3 SCOTT § 236.3 notes a recent trend away from the Pennsylvania rule and
toward the Massachusetts rule. See RESTATEMENT § 236(b).
85 See, e.g., Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Apponyi, 220 Md. 658, 152
A.2d 184 (1959), in which, on account of a single stock dividend distribution, the
life tenant received 26% of the total trust estate.
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toward rules which distinguish corporate distributions by size rather than
form.8 6
C. What the Settlor May Provide
When the settlor is fully cognizant of the low dividend yield of typical
investment grade stocks, he may wish to protect the life tenant by the
terms of the trust instrument in a manner that will permit common stocks
to be held for the benefit of the trust as a whole without depressing
current income. However, in order to achieve impartiality prospectively,
the settlor is confronted with the choice between formulating his own
unconventional rules and giving a large measure of discretion to the
trustee.
1. External Standards
When the settlor is primarily interested in providing for the life
tenant, the most direct approach is to vest the trustee with power to
distribute income, or corpus if necessary, to provide a fixed dollar amount
or to satisfy the life tenant's needs. In effect this insulates the life
tenant from the trustee's investment performance, except for the possibility
that the corpus may entirely disappear, and enables the trustee to formulate
an investment policy similar to that of an individual providing for his
own support.
Although this approach would apparently facilitate a growth-oriented
investment policy, it may tend to produce the opposite result. When the
life tenant's income has been established by the settlor or left to the dis-
cretion of the trustee, there is more likelihood that the trustee will follow an
unimaginative and overly cautious investment program in order to satisfy
his obligation to the life tenant without invading corpus. Moreover, the
imposition of external standards also insulates the trustee from criticism
by the beneficiaries. So long as his needs are adequately supplied, the
life tenant has no reason to complain; and the remainderman, because of
the residuary nature of his estate, has no standing to object. This analysis
does not imply that a trustee would be insensitive to a settlor's desire for
optimum results, but this implicit direction is a poor substitute for the
incentive effect of a life tenant with a stake in superior performance.
2. Powers of Allocation
If the trustee is given a broad power to allocate, he will be able to
use the full return from overproductive property in order to compensate
the life tenant for the income deficiency resulting from the ownership of
common stocks.8 7 However, if no standards are established for the use of
86See N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAw § 17-a(2); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 3470.5(1)
(Supp. 1963), which provide that stock dividends of less than 6% are income, and
those exceeding that amount are principal.
87 See text accompanying notes 60-62 supra.
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these powers, they could be used to introduce still further distortion in
the relationship between the beneficial interests. As the court recognized
in State Street Trust Co. v. United States,88 broad powers of investment
and allocation, taken together, give the trustee even more opportunity to
alter the enjoyment of the trust property than do rather broadly defined
powers to accumulate and invade.89
In order to avoid giving the trustee overly broad discretion, with
possible adverse tax consequences, ° the settlor should provide that the dis-
cretionary power to vary the normal allocation rules be used only for the
purpose of assuring the income beneficiary a reasonable return on the
trust assets. Moreover, the efficacy of this plan depends on there being
receipts to allocate, and to the extent that the trustee includes over-
productive property in the trust portfolio, the potential for growth is
reduced.
3. Rules of Allocation
The trustee's ability to provide adequate income may be improved
somewhat if the settlor provides that such items as stock dividends,
preemptive rights,91 and mutual fund capital gain distributions be allocated
to income. The use of these provisions can avoid the contrary rules of
many jurisdictions and increase the trustee's range of satisfactory invest-
ments. However, the effectiveness of varying the allocation rules is
limited by the fact that the vast majority of corporations do not regularly
make such distributions.
92
The only settlor-created allocation rule that might seem to furnish
entirely adequate relief would be one providing that all or some per-
88263 F2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959).
89 See Gray & Covey, State Street-A Case Study of Sections 2036(a) (2) and
2038, 15 TAx L. REv. 75 (1959). Compare Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1947).
90 The issue in State Street was the includibility of the corpus in the grantor-
trustee's estate under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 2036, 2038. A similar provision
might subject the grantor to taxation on the trust's income under § 674, destroy the
marital deduction under the "all the income" provision of § 2056(b) (5), or result
in the inclusion of the corpus in a life tenant-trustee's estate under § 2041.
91 Although there is a split among jurisdictions regarding stock dividends and
mutual fund capital gain distributions, preemptive rights have almost invariably been
treated as capital. See 3 ScoTT § 236.9. When a listed corporation distributes rights
to purchase shares at a price less than the established market, these rights are immedi-
ately marketable at a price approximating the amount by which the market price of
the shares exceeds the subscription price. While it is true that the corporation has
not distributed any of its assets to its shareholders, it has foregone the opportunity
to realize this increment from the public and, in effect, has assigned it to the stock-
holders. From this standpoint, it represents no less a corporate distribution than
does a stock dividend, affording the shareholder current income should he decide to sell.
When the corporation is closely held and the shares not readily marketable, the
rights do not represent the equivalent of cash for the same reasons that stock divi-
dends in such corporations are of questionable value to life tenants. See 3 Scow
§ 231.3. Compare note 29 mipra.
92 In effect these provisions put the trustee in the same position as trustees in
jurisdictions where the law is favorable to life tenants with regard to noncash cor-
porate distributions. See text accompanying notes 80-86 supra.
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centage of realized capital gains be paid to the life tenant. This would
enable the trustee to invest in stock, irrespective of corporate dividend
policy, and, by making periodic profitable sales, supplement an otherwise
inadequate income. Unless limited by some standard, however, this plan
would vest the trustee with an enormous power to vary the beneficial
interests, since the decision to realize gains would be his alone. If the
decision were made solely on the basis of investment objectivity, an
undesirable widely fluctuating income for the life tenant would probably
result.913 If, on the other hand, the trustee were obligated by the instru-
ment to realize gains to the extent of providing a reasonable income, his
investment decisions might be unduly motivated by considerations other
than investment potential.94
The treatment of capital losses might also be troublesome. If they
are to be offset against gains, a loss sale would either serve to reduce the
life tenant's income or compel the realization of additional taxable gains.
If they are to be charged against corpus, the benefit of a tax deduction may
be entirely lost.95 Furthermore, in contrast to a corpus distribution of
equivalent amount, allocation of realized gains to income requires the
payment of tax on the total amount of the distribution. 96 However, despite
a higher immediate tax, the burden is equitably distributed since the life
tenant pays the tax, and the trust recovers its full original basis tax free.
97
4. The "Percentage" Trust
An approach which has recently been suggested would ignore the
traditional distinctions between income and principal and substitute the
settlor's own definition of the life tenant's interest. The settlor would
generally provide that the life tenant be paid that amount which the
current value of the corpus would produce if it were invested in reason-
ably safe bonds.98 The interests of the beneficiaries would be parallel
93 A partial solution to this problem might be to allocate realized gains to income
but to vest the trustee with power to accumulate income for future distribution.
94 The necessity of realizing gains to meet an obligation would encourage "trading"
as opposed to "investment." If only net gains could be distributed, the trustee would
be reluctant to dispose of stock which had declined, despite poor prospects. Gains
from stock which had appreciated and ought to be retained could be realized only
through sale and repurchase at the cost of additional taxes and commissions. To
avoid these burdens, the trustee would be encouraged to confine his investments to
securities which provided ample current income, obviating the necessity for securing
appreciation and thus defeating the purpose of the settlor's provision.
95 A loss will result in no tax benefit when the trust has no taxable income.
When there is other income, the benefit is limited to the extent of offsetting $1,000
each year. IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1211(b). Perhaps this problem could be solved
by allocating all losses and only a percentage of gains to corpus. Hopefully, there
would be sufficient gain to afford the life tenant with a reasonable income in addition
to offsetting realized losses.
96 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 643(a) (3) (A).
9 7 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1015(b).
98 Clark, Power To Invest Without Yield, 100 TRUSTS & ESTATES 495 (1961);
see Wells, Pity the Poor Income Beneficiary-How To Reconcile Growth and Yield?,
103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 119 (1964).
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instead of adverse--the life tenant benefiting from appreciation to the
extent that it increased the income base and the remainderman benefiting
from higher dividends to the extent that fewer trust assets need be
distributed to compensate for any income deficiency. And the trustee
could be completely objective with regard to investments, selecting those
investments which promised the best combined return, regardless of
corporate dividend policies.
Unfortunately, however valid the settlor's definition might be for the
purpose of effecting impartiality between beneficiaries, other consequences
of the trust relationship would probably be viewed in terms of the historic
distinctions. 9° While, in practice, the percentage trust would probably
require annual corpus distributions, the accumulation of income is theo-
retically possible. In order to avoid invalidity under statutes forbidding
accumulations or disallowance of the marital deduction, it would be
desirable to provide that questionable receipts, like stock dividends, be
added to corpus and that the percentage amount be only a lower limit to
income distributions to be disregarded whenever it was exceeded by income
as traditionally defined.
Since the settlor substantially departs from the traditional definition
of income, the percentage trust would probably not qualify for treatment
as a "simple trust" under the Internal Revenue Code, 0° thus sacificing
a higher personal exemption and other favorable income tax advan-
tages.' 0 ' The probable income tax treatment would introduce some
inequity between beneficiaries, since the life tenant would be taxed only
to the extent that the trust received distributable net income.' 0 2  To the
extent that the distributions exceeded that amount, the life tenant would
receive them tax free as corpus distributions and the basis of the trust
assets would be correspondingly reduced, resulting in an additional tax
burden for either the trust or surviving remainderman 03
III. A SUGGESTION FOR RELIEF
In several situations the courts have recognized that exclusion would
be an inappropriate solution to the problem which arises when the income
99 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.643(b)-1 (1956), which states that "trust provisions
which depart fundamentally from concepts of local law in the determination of what
constitutes income are not recognized . .. ."
100 See Treas. Reg. § 1.651(a)-2(a) (1956). But see Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-5
(f) (3) which provides that "the rules to be applied . . . in allocation . . . between
income and corpus must be considered in relation to the nature and productivity of
the assets passing in trust .... ."
I01 See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 642(b), 643(a) (4), 668(a).
10
2 INT. REv. CODE or 1954, §§ 662(a)(1)-(2).
103 Since an early amendment of the tax law is not to be expected, the settlor
might want to compensate for this imbalance by providing for a percentage distribu-
tion somewhat less than the bond yield, or by providing that the life tenant be paid
the income and such amounts of corpus as would be necessary to provide him with an
income after taxes equivalent to that which he would have received had the trust
assets been invested in bonds, the interest from which would be fully taxable to him.
Compare the suggested amendment in note 138 infra.
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characteristics of an investment would prejudice the interest of one of the
beneficiaries. In these cases the courts have enabled the trustee to retain
economically sound investments and have achieved impartiality by an
equitable redistribution of the benefits.
A. Analogous Problems
1. Overproductive Property
Many investments, such as annuity contracts, leaseholds, patent rights,
natural resources, and depreciable real estate, provide reasonable income
and safety of capital; but for trust purposes, this property suffers from
the same infirmity as common stocks-an imbalance between current re-
ceipts and residual value. Since part of the current receipts from such
property represents a return of capital, if all receipts were allocated to
income, the property could not be retained without prejudicing the re-
mainderman for the benefit of the life tenant. However, in addition to the
remedy of exclusion, which could deprive the trustee of many otherwise
satisfactory investment opportunities, the law has provided an alternative
solution,1 4 variously denominated as depreciation,1 5 amortization,'0 8 or
apportionment,10 7 which permits the retention of the property but redis-
tributes the benefits.
10 8
Redistribution may be accomplished either by withholding a predeter-
mined amount from the receipts, representing the return of capital, and al-
locating the balance to income ' 0 9 or by allocating a predetermined amount
to income, representing a reasonable yield on the investment, and retaining
the balance in the trust." 0 The first procedure, based on the premise that
the primary objective is to preserve the corpus intact, assigns the risk of
inadequacy, as well as the benefit of any excess income, to the life tenant.
The second insures a reasonable income to the life tenant and allocates
the risk of loss and benefit of gain to the trust. Section 11 of the Uniform
Act adopts the second approach in the case of most overproductive prop-
104 See RESTATEMENT § 239 which provides: "[I]f property held in trust [for
successive beneficiaries] . . . is wasting property, the trustee is under a duty . . .
either (a) to make provision for amortization, or (b) to sell such property."
105 See 3 ScOTT § 239.4 (buildings).
106 See id. § 239.2 (premium bonds).
107 See id. § 239.3 (natural resources).
108 See id. §§ 239, 241.4.
109 The most common illustration of this principle is in the case of depreciable
real estate, in which the asset's value is divided by its estimated life, and the ratable
amount is deducted each year from the gross rentals. When the rentals fall short of
providing for both depreciation and reasonable income, the life tenant absorbs the
entire loss. See RvisED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT § 13 (a) (2).
110 See REvisFD UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 11, which provides in
the case of "leaseholds, patents, copyrights, royalty rights, and rights to receive pay-
ments on a contract for deferred compensation," that "receipts . . . not in excess
of 5%y per year of its inventory value, are income, and the balance is principal."
Compare REvIsED UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT § 9(a) (3), which, in the
interest of simplicity and in conformity with income tax requirements, establishes a
depletion reserve of 27'A% of the gross receipts from natural resource properties.
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erty, apparently on the theory that steady and adequate income is to be
preferred to uncertainty."' However, both approaches are grounded upon
the common principle that one beneficiary should have a priority claim on
the receipts, and the other, by virtue of his awaiting the satisfaction of the
prior claim, is entitled to any excess benefits.
Either approach requires the establishment of a valuation for the
property upon which the scheme of redistribution is based. Although the
failure to use current market value introduces some distortion, the con-
siderable burden of continuous revaluation is eliminated by using the in-
ventory value or cost as the base amount.1 2 However, if the market value
of the property were independently determinable and readily available to the
trustee, these adjustments would be feasible.
The distinguishing characteristic of overproductive property, of course,
is that the trustee currently receives amounts which are more than adequate
to provide a reasonable income. A system of apportionment of the benefits
of common stock investment would require the trustee himself to separate
property from the trust corpus to supplement the dividends.
2. Underproductive Property
Requests from life tenants that inadequate current income be supple-
mented by the trust have almost invariably been denied." 3 The courts
have consistently held that any appropriate adjustment of the beneficial
interests must await the sale of the property.114 As the court said in Mat-
ter of Winthrop: "It would introduce an unprecedented and dangerous
element into the administration of estates if liquid assets could be devoted
to income payment because other capital assets do not pay interest cur-
rently. . . . There is no warrant for apportionment until there are pro-
ceeds to be apportioned." 115 The underproductive assets there under con-
sideration were defaulted bonds which, despite an inventory valuation of
$199,000, were not currently marketable. As the court pointed out, the
amount, if any, that would ultimately be realized was a matter of pure
conjecture. 116
A similar but distinguishable problem was considered by the court
in Will of Wehner,117 where the trustee held a United States savings bond
which paid no current interest, but would provide an ample yield at matu-
"'1 It should be noted that this approach does not entirely deprive the life tenant
of extra benefit when the actual receipts exceed those anticipated. The excess receipts
become part of the corpus and their investment will presumably enhance subsequent
income.
112 See REvIsED UNiFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT §§ 11 (requiring income
payments to be computed as a percentage of "inventory value"), 13(a) (2) (requiring
"generally accepted accounting practices" which compute depreciation on the basis of
historical costs).
113 See 3 ScoTT § 241.1, at 1895.
114 See id. § 240.1, at 1877. See generally id. §§ 240-41.3A.
11 168 Misc. 861, 863, 6 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (Surr. Ct. 1938).
116 Ibid.
117 238 Wis. 557, 300 N.W. 241 (1941).
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rity. The life tenant and trustee petitioned the court to allow periodic pay-
ments to the life tenant on the theory that the trust would be purchasing the
life tenant's interest in the accumulating income which, when realized at
maturity, would then belong to the trust. The court allowed the requested
plan, stating:
Here is a security admittedly as good as any which would be
purchased in the market and bearing a higher rate of interest than
any other security equally as good. If the . . . income could
not be anticipated . . . the trustee would be obliged to sur-
render the bond ....
This plan makes the United States savings bonds a practical
and workable form of investment for trust funds in a manner
which assures the life tenant a steady flow of income while at the
same time keeping the funds of the remainderman safely in-
vested . ... 118
A comparison of the property involved in the Winthrop and Wehner
cases suggests several important distinctions. In Winthrop the amount of
ultimate recovery on the bonds was unascertainable, and there was no
market in which to dispose of them currently. Immediate exclusion would
have been futile, because there would have been no receipts to apportion.
Moreover, since the bonds had become imprudent trust investments and
were to be sold at the earliest feasible opportunity, the court was not im-
pelled to justify their retention by devising a method for the interim satis-
faction of the life tenant.
In Wehner, on the other hand, not only was the amount and time of
ultimate recovery certain, but the bond could have been currently sur-
rendered for its fair value. Immediate disposal of the bond would have
produced apportionable receipts, but it would have deprived the trust of an
advantageous and prudent investment. In order to justify retention of the
bond, the court paralleled the available apportionment remedy of the life
tenant without requiring sale. Viewing this result within the apportion-
ment concept, the trustee could be regarded as having sold the bond, ap-
portioned the proceeds, and repurchased a similar bond with the balance of
funds remaining in the corpus. Moreover, the measure of relief provided
by the court suggests that anticipatory apportionment can be justified by
current marketability at fair value and need not depend on the certainty of
the amount ultimately to be received. The actual payments to the life
tenant were not pro rata divisions of the amount he would have received
118 Id. at 562, 300 N.W. at 243. The threshold question in Wehner was whether
the amount by which the redemption value of the bond exceeded its cost was principal
or income. The court quickly disposed of this issue, holding that it was delayed
interest. Ibid. See generally 3 ScoT § 233.1, at 1749; Forer, Discounts in Trust
Investments, 24 MINN. L REv. 201 (1940); 40 Micn. L. REv. 1113 (1942) (com-
menting on Weluner).
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at maturity, but represented the increments in the current redemption value
of the bond-that is, the income that could have been but was not realized.
Although the amount ultimately to be received from the disposition
of a stock cannot be ascertained, retention of the stock can be characterized
as a continuous decision to sell and repurchase at its current fair market
value. Viewed in this way, listed stocks would seem to be proper subjects
for anticipatory apportionment under the rationale of the Wehner case.
Another problem in a scheme of anticipatory apportionment is the
availability of funds. The trustee in Wehner admitted that his plan would
not have been feasible had the trust not been in possession of cash with
which to make the income payments. 19 However, since shares of stock
have the attribute of easy divisibility, apportionment of unrealized appre-
ciation need not depend on other liquid assets in the trust. Required dis-
tributions could be made directly from the underproductive property.
B. A Practical Formula
Theoretically, the life tenant is not entitled to the total increment in
the value of common stocks, but only to that resulting from discretionary
reinvestment of earnings. °2 0 As a practical matter, the calculation of this
amount is not possible, but this difficulty does not preclude the use of a plan
based on a recognition of the life tenant's right to a reasonable income. If
the principles of section 11 of the Uniform Act were applied to this end,
the life tenant would be guaranteed a reasonable return on the trustee's cost
of the stock, and any appreciation in excess of the amount needed to insure
that return would remain in the trust. In the preceding example of a trust
with a corpus of $100,000,121 this approach would produce the results in-
dicated in Table 2.
Under this plan the life tenant would receive the same income he
would have received from 4/ 2 percent bonds until the dividend exceeded
that amount.'2 The decreasing income deficiency would be made up with
distributions of either corpus stock or cash. Since the life tenant would
not be called upon to make any sacrifice of current income, the plan would
insure a minimum of fairness. However, this plan fails to provide the
life tenant with any benefit from appreciation during the first ten years
and allows him to participate in it thereafter to the limited extent that is
reflected in dividend increases. Thus, even after twenty years in the
example given, cumulative income exceeds the $90,000 available from
bond interest by only 13 percent while the corpus has increased by 134
percent.
119 See 55 HAxv. L. REv. 884 (1942).
120 Compare text accompanying notes 23-29 supra.
121 See text accompanying note 12 supra.
A22 strict application of § 11 would require that the $4,500 income be a maxi-
mum as well as a minimum limit. In that event the amount by which dividends
exceeded $4,500 would be deducted from income and retained in the corpus. Such
a procedure would deny the life tenant any participation in the benefits of appre-
ciation.














































This imbalance necessarily results from the use of the original value
of the corpus as the basis on which the life tenant's interest is computed.
However, a prudent investor would look to the current value of his capital
to determine whether the return met his minimum acceptable standard.
Since the alternative bond investment is continuously available,1 2 the life
tenant should be entitled to a reasonable yield on the appreciated value of
the corpus. Moreover, when the corpus consists of listed stocks, con-
tinuous valuation imposes no great burden on the trustee as would be the
case when the property could be valued only by capitalizing expected
receipts. Under a plan for full recognition of the life tenant's interest, the
trustee would determine the amount of the required annual income by
multiplying the market value of the stock at the beginning of the year by
the bond yield. At the end of the year, he would distribute sufficient
corpus stock or other assets to make up the amount by which this figure
exceeded the dividends received. In the example given, the results would
be as indicated in Table 3.

















































Year Corpus Dividend bution Income Income
1 100,000 3,000 1,500 4,500 4,500
2 103,500 3,105 1,553 4,658 9,158
3 107,122 3,214 1,606 4,820 13,978
4 110,872 3,326 1,663 4,989 18,967
5 114,753 3,443 1,721 5,164 24,131
6 118,770 3,563 1,782 5,345 29,476
7 122,927 3,688 1,844 5,532 35,008
8 127,229 3,817 1,908 5,725 40,733
9 131,682 3,950 1,976 5,926 46,659
10 136,290 4,089 2,044 6,133 52,792
11 141,061 4,232 2,116 6,348 59,140
12 145,998 4,380 2,190 6,570 65,710
13 151,108 4,533 2,267 6,800 72,510
14 156,396 4,692 2,346 7,038 79,548
15 161,870 4,856 2,428 7,284 86,832
16 167,536 5,026 2,513 7,539 94,371
17 173,400 5,202 2,601 7,803 102,174
18 179,469 5,384 2,692 8,076 110,250
19 185,750 5,573 2,786 8,359 118,609
20 192,252 5,768 2,883 8,651 127,260
Each beneficiary now participates in the benefits of appreciation to
the extent of his interest. It may be argued, however, that the suggested
plan may require corpus distributions in the absence of appreciation, and
that even when appreciation has taken place, there is no guarantee, as there
was with the government bond in Wehner, that it will ultimately be
realized. These objections do not recognize that under the current rules
the remainderman receives unjustified protection by the failure to burden
his estate with the true cost of low-yielding stock.
The suggested plan does effectuate an equitable distribution of the
risk of market performance. If the combined return were exactly equal
to the bond yield-the minimum acceptable standard-the value of the
corpus shares after the deficiency distribution would equal the value at the
beginning of the year. If the combined return were higher, the remainder-
man is in a better position by the amount of the excess than he would
have been had the trustee purchased bonds; the life tenant will also benefit,
because his future income will be based on the increased market value of
the corpus shares. If the combined return should fall short of the bond
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yield, the remainderman properly suffers the primary loss, and the life
tenant shares that loss to the extent that his future income will be reduced.
Since the life tenant benefits from excess appreciation, it is equitable that he
should bear some of the loss, but only to the extent of his interest in pos-
sible gain.
In effect this plan would produce the same results that would flow
from the corporation's annual distribution of a stock dividend, allocable to
income and equal in amount to the difference between the bond yield and
the dividend yield. In that event the trust's percentage interest in the
corporation would be slightly reduced, 24 and the life tenant would receive
a reasonable return on the market value of the investment. Since a
prudent stock investment should be justified by actual corporate earnings,
the plan would effectuate an equitable distribution of these earnings when-
ever the corporate directors failed to do so.
The suggested plan would not impose any unreasonable requirements
on the trustee's investment performance. If a trustee cannot confidently
anticipate a combined return from a contemplated stock purchase exceeding
the bond yield, he should buy bonds instead. When the price of a stock
is justified by current earnings which, if not distributed, constitute a
planned addition to corporate assets, the expectation of growth would
seem entirely reasonable. On the other hand, an earnings-price ratio
lower than the bond yield would suggest that growth prospects were
based on speculation, and that the stock was an inappropriate trust invest-
ment. The suggested allocation would result in corpus depletion only
when the trustee made investments which failed to produce the minimum
appreciation that a prudent individual would accept. So long as his
expectation of satisfactory appreciation was reasonable when the invest-
ment was made, the trustee should not be subject to criticism.
In both mechanics and theory, the suggested plan is necessarily
limited to stocks which can be readily valued and for which a con-
tinuous market exists. It obviously cannot be applied to stock in closely
held corporations where both value and marketability are matters of
conjecture. Therefore, if the requirement of a reasonable income is to be
satisfied, such stocks would seem to be inappropriate trust investments
when the yield is subnormal, unless the trustee is in a position to compel
a more favorable dividend policy. However, when the settlor has provided
that such stocks be held in the trust, it can fairly be presumed that his
intent was to leave the life tenant with whatever benefits the directors
chose to provide.
124 This analysis is necessarily based on the assumption that the stock is in widely
held companies where the trust's percentage interest is of no significance. When
the company is closely held, and the trust's ownership represents control, an entirely
different set of considerations is applicable. In that event it could be reasoned that
the element of control was a part of the trust property, and any diminution of interest
would be inconsistent with its preservation.
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C. Tax Considerations
The tax treatment of deficiency distributions under the present Code
is likely to introduce some imbalance. Unless there is an excess of
undistributed net income, allocating corpus shares to the life tenant will
have no immediate tax consequences either to him or to the trust. 125 When
the life tenant sells these shares, however, he will recover, free of tax, the
portion of the trust's basis allocable to them.' 2 6 On the other hand, the
basis of the shares remaining in the corpus is reduced by the amount
allocable to the distributed shares,'127 resulting in an additional taxable
gain upon sale by the trust or by the remainderman. Since, over a period
of time, especially with very low yielding stock, the cumulative deficiency
distributions could represent a substantial portion of the original holding,
the additional tax burden could be serious.128 The same imbalance pres-
ently results when stock dividends are allocated to income.
1 29
If taxes are not considered, it is immaterial whether deficiency dis-
tributions are paid in corpus shares or in cash. But if the trustee should
adopt the alternative procedure of distributing cash in lieu of corpus
shares, the imbalance introduced by taxes is even more severe, since the life
tenant would then receive the payment as a corpus distribution unburdened
125 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 305 (a), 643.
126 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 307(a), 1012, 1015.
127 Ibid.
1 28 In the example given in Table 3, the payment of twenty annual deficiency
distributions, each in the amount of 1/2%%, would result in a 23% reduction in the
trust's basis. If the stock paid no dividend, thus requiring annual distributions of
4y2%, the reduction in basis, over a twenty year period, would exceed 47%.
129 If a company paid an annual stock dividend of 5%, the life tenant, over a
period of ten years, would not only acquire half as many shares as the trust, but would
also siphon off one-third of the trust's original basis. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 307(a).
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), which held stock dividends nontaxable,
was based on the theory that the stockholder's position was essentially unchanged
by the declaration, and that nothing had been separated from his original investment.
Consequently, the shareholder's original basis is properly distributed ratably over the
larger number of shares.
When the ownership of the dividend stock, by operation of law or the trust
instrument, immediately vests in the life tenant, the validity of this rationale dis-
appears. Property has been separated from the original investment and distributed
to a third party. Equitable distribution of the tax burden requires that the trust's
basis remain intact and that the dividend stock have a zero basis in the hands of the
life tenant. This is essentially the result of the procedure which can be elected upon
receipt of stock rights valued at less than 15% of the old stock. INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 307(b).
To require this procedure when a trust receives stock dividends allocable to
income would have no immediate tax consequences, but would effectuate a fairly
distributed tax burden when either the corpus or dividend stock were sold. Its effect
on Government revenues would depend on whether sale was made prior or subsequent
to the death of the respective beneficiary. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1012, 1014-15.
It is not suggested that this procedure be afforded to an individual stockholder,
since it would enable him to recover his full original basis upon sale of the old stock,
while retaining the dividend stock. The situation is distinguishable from the receipt
of rights which generally must be sold within a short period of time, since dividend
stock may be retained indefinitely.
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by any tax, while the total basis of the trust property would be reduced
by an equivalent amount. It might be possible for the trustee to avoid
all or part of this inequity by employing capital gains realized by the trust
for distribution to the life tenant.
1 30
The tax burden could be distributed equitably by a new code section
based on the theory of the Wehner case, in which the trustee conceptualized
the transaction as the trust's purchasing the life tenant's interest in
unrealized appreciation. Following that rationale, the total amount of the
deficiency distribution would be taxable to the life tenant when he received
it,' 3 ' and the equivalent amount would be added to the trust's basis of
the stocks by reference to which the distribution was made. 32 Since this
transaction does not come within the statutory categories of tax-free
exchanges, 33 a distribution in kind would require the trust to recognize
taxable gain to the extent that the market value of the distributed stock
exceeded its basis. 34 This tax, however, would be offset by the stepped-up
basis that the trust would acquire for the stock retained. 35 Unless the
life tenant's interest in unrealized appreciation could be regarded as a
capital asset,136 an unlikely result, 37 the distribution would be taxed as
ordinary income to him. The extent to which this might be prejudicial
would depend on whether the distributions were compelled by law or
elected by the life tenant or trustee. If elected, the result would seem
proper since the underlying theory of the distribution is that it is a sub-
stitute for bond interest, which would be taxed at ordinary rates.'38
130 See Treas. Reg. § 1.643(a)-3(a) (2) (1956).
13 1 The receipt would seem to be a gain "derived from dealings in property"
within the meaning of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61(a) (3). Since the property sold
is the unrealized appreciation accruing subsequent to the transfer in trust, the life
tenant's basis would be zero and the amount taxable in full.
:L= INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1012. The transaction should be properly recorded
and identified. Compare Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1012-1(a), (c) (1957).
133 INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1031-37. These exceptions are to be strictly con-
strued. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1957).
134 INT. R v. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001-02.
135 Since the fair market value of the distributed stock would be added to the
basis of the remaining corpus stock, note 132 supra, the gain realized on the ultimate
disposition of the corpus stock would be correspondingly reduced.
136 Since the life tenant still retains an income interest in the corpus stock, the
sale would not come within the rule of McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947), which required "an out-and-out
transfer of a substantial and durable property interest" as a condition of capital gain
treatment
137 The situation is analogous to cases dealing with anticipation of other forms
of income in which capital gain treatment was denied. See, e.g., Hort v. Commissioner,
313 U.S. 28 (1941) (rentals) ; Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 50 (6th
Cir. 1942) (dividends).
138 A suggested code provision reflecting the foregoing considerations follows:
DEFICIENCY DISTRIBUTIONS
(a) DEFiCiENcY DISTRMUTIoN DEFINED--Any distribution made by a trust
to an income beneficiary which is
(1) required by a court or the trust instrument, or elected by the trustee
under applicable state law, and
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D. The Scope of Relief
The final question is whether a system of anticipatory apportionment
should be a rule of trust administration or an elective remedy. Since
remaindermen are frequently unascertained, unborn, or in their minority,
the courts have properly taken it upon themselves to establish rules to
protect their estates. For example, absent contrary directions by the
settlor, a trustee is compelled to apportion the receipts from wasting
property. 139 Life tenants, on the other hand, are currently able to demand
their rights and to enforce them in judicial proceedings, and property
which is improperly withheld from the life tenant usually remains in the
corpus. Thus, the imposition of a mandatory rule is unnecessary to
achieve adequate protection.
Moreover, the relationship between life tenants and remaindermen
is frequently such that the life tenant prefers to sacrifice current income
for the purpose of increasing the corpus.140 Although the same result
would ensue if the life tenant received a higher income which he sub-
sequently gave or bequeathed to the remainderman, such a procedure
would involve higher income, gift, and estate taxation.14' It may also be
(2) the amount of which is computed by reference to the amount by
which the bond yield or a fixed percentage, not more than 59,
exceeds the dividends received from stock owned by the trust
shall be deemed a "deficiency distribution."
(b) TAXES IMPOSED ON THE BENEFICIARY-The total of the money and the
fair market value of property received as a deficiency distribution shall
be included in the income of a beneficiary or beneficiaries of the trust
when paid, credited, or required to be distributed.
(c) BASIS OF THE TRUST STOCK-The amount of a deficiency distribution
taxable to a beneficiary or beneficiaries under subsection (b) shall be
added to the basis of the stock by reference to which the amount of such
distribution is computed.
(d) DISTRIUTIONS IN KIND--The payment by the trust of a deficiency dis-
tribution in property other than money shall be regarded as the sale or
exchange of a capital asset.
139 See text accompanying notes 104-08 .rpra. Apportionment may not be com-
pelled when the wasting property is included in the corpus when it passes from the
settlor. In that event, however, the contrary direction of the settlor is implied.
140 The power to designate another person to receive property or the income
therefrom has been equated with enjoyment. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 674, 2036.
141 By investing in low-yielding stock, an individual may avoid the current taxation
of income which he might otherwise have received. A rule which required a life
tenant to realize maximum income would deny him a right available to any other
taxpayer-investor.
On the other hand, the increment in the value of the stock is taxable to an indi-
vidual when he sells the stock and subject to gift or estate tax should he dispose of
it by gift or will. In the case of a trust, the full benefit of this "donated" income
passes to the remainderman unencumbered by either gift or estate tax and subject
only to capital gain taxation when and if he sells the stock.
Even if the remedy of anticipatory apportionment is elective, it might be argued
that the life tenant's failure to enforce it is equivalent to the release of a power of
appointment under § 2041 (a) (2) and § 2514(b), thus subjecting him to estate or gift
taxation on the amount which he could have but did not obtain. See Treas. Reg.
§§20.2041-1(b) (1), 25.2514-1(b)(1) (1961). Perhaps such a consequence might
be avoided by disclaimer as provided under Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(d) (6) (1954)
and Treas. Reg. § 25.2514-3(c) (4) (1958).
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inferred that the settlor of a trust which can include common stocks has
intended to provide this alternative. Consequently, a rule which invariably
required apportionment would be undesirable.
When the life tenant needs or wants a reasonable return on the trust
corpus, the availability of an elective remedy of anticipatory apportionment
would enable him to obtain it without interfering with a growth-oriented
investment program. Since the inclusion of some low-yielding stocks will
not be prejudicial when the corpus also contains a substantial amount
of property with an above-average yield, granting the remedy should be
conditioned upon proof that the trust, as a whole, produces a subnormal
yield. Finally, since the trustee's investment decisions may turn on
whether unrealized appreciation is to be apportioned, the remedy should be
granted only prospectively.
Another application of anticipatory apportionment would be as an
optional procedure for a trustee, enabling him to satisfy a justifiable de-
mand for adequate income without requiring that he invest in property
which he adjudged to have inferior potential. Again, to protect the
remainderman, the use of this procedure should require a showing of an
inadequate return on the trust as a whole.
IV. CONCLUSION
In today's economic environment common stocks provide the most
feasible vehicle for combating the inroads of inflation. Their inclusion
in trust portfolios, however, creates problems of inequity which are not
easily solved. In the administration of a simple trust, current solutions are
at best compromises not wholly satisfactory to either beneficiary. While
the imposition of an unalterable rule seems neither necessary nor desirable,
a system of anticipatory apportionment as an elective remedy for life tenants
and as an optional procedure for trustees would appear to provide the ap-
propriate measure of relief.
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